The Supreme Court, on 27th April 2020 in State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah (Criminal Appeal No. 989 of 2018) ruled that a ‘deemed university’ will be encompassed within the ambit of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the PC Act’). Justice N.V. Ramana penned the majority opinion for himself and for Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, and Justice Ajay Rastogi penned a separate but concurring opinion.

Factual Background:

  • The respondent in the instant matter is allegedly a trustee of a trust, which established and sponsors a deemed university. An FIR was filed against four accused persons including the present respondent, on the allegation that a bribe of Rs. 25 lakhs was demanded by the accused for permitting the complainant’s daughter to appear for the final examination. Thereafter, the complainant, who was unwilling to pay the amount, filed an FIR.

  • It was stated that after the demand was made, the currency notes coated with phenolphthalein powder were delivered to the respondent’s agent, who further confirmed the receipt of money to the respondent. The conversation was intercepted in an audio video camera set up by the complainant and separate raids conducted also unearthed several undated cheques drawn in the name of the institution worth more than Rs. 100 crores and certain fixed deposits.

  • Subsequently, a chargesheet came to be filed against the accused for various offences under sections 7,8,10 and 13(1)(v) and 13(2) of the PC Act read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent filed a discharge application under section 227 of CrPC before the District and Sessions Court but the application came to be rejected by the Court.

  • Thereafter, the respondent filed a criminal revision application before the High Court of Gujarat, at Ahmedabad, and the High court allowed the revision and discharged the accused-respondent. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the State of Gujarat filed the present appeal.

Arguments:

For Appellant:

  • PC Act is a comprehensive statute which was passed to prevent corruption and therefore, should be construed liberally as the legislature intended to include acts which harm the public at large, within the ambit of the Act.

  • Public function need not be the exclusive domain of the State; private institutions such as universities may also perform a public function.

For Respondent:

  • Criminal statutes should be construed strictly and in cases where two interpretations are possible, the Courts must lean towards the construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes the same.

  • The respondent, being a trustee, cannot be termed as a Public servant. No allegation in charge sheet that the respondent was holding any position or post in the institution or that he was engaged by the institution for rendering any service.

  • PC Act was inapplicable to the institution i.e., a ‘deemed to be university’. The term ‘University’ needs to be read in accordance with section 2(f), 3 and 23 of the UGC Act wherein a ‘deemed university’ is different from a ‘University’.

Issues and Reasoning by the Court:

  • Whether ‘Deemed University’ is covered under the provisions of the PC Act?

Section 2(c)(xi) defines public servant in the following terms:

“any person who is Vice-Chancellor or member of any governing body, professor, reader, lecturer or any other teacher or employee, by whatever designation called, of any University and any person whose services have been availed of by a University or any other public authority in connection with holding or conducting examinations”

The Court observed that to ascertain whether a ‘Deemed University’ falls within the ambit of the Act, interpretative necessity of the term ‘University’ occurring in the definition of public-servant arises.The Court referred to the judgment in Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64 wherein it was held as follows:

“Therefore, the duty of the Court is that any anti-corruption has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption. That is to say in a situation where two constrictions are eminently reasonable, the Court has to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption t the one which seeks to perpetuate it.”

The Court held that the term University cannot be read in accordance with Section 2(f) , 3 and 23 of the UGC Act, wherein a ‘Deemed University’ is different from a ‘University’ stricto sensu as the UGC Act and the PC Act are enactments which are completely distinct in their purpose, operation and object. The UGC Act makes provision for the coordination and determination of standards in Universities and for that purpose, establishes a University Grants Commission, whereas the PC Act is an enactment meant to curb the social evil of corruption in the country. Therefore, the extension of technical definitions used under the UGC Act to the PC Act will not appropriate as the statutes are not pari materia with one another.

The Court proceeded to observe that the object of the PC Act was not only to prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be considered public servants and therefore, it cannot be stated that a ‘Deemed University’ and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a University simpliciter and the officials therein. Therefore, a ‘Deemed University’ is also covered under the provisions of the PC Act.

  • Whether the respondent-trustee is a public servant covered under Section 2(c) of the Act?

The Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Manish Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 14 SCC 420, wherein the following observations were made:

“The present Act (the 1988 Act) envisages widening of the scope of the definition of the expression ‘public servant’. It was brought in force to purify public administration. The legislature has used a comprehensive definition of ‘public servant’ to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing corruption among public servants. Hence, it would be inappropriate to limit the contents of the definition clause by a construction which would be against the spirit of the statute…. Clause (viii) of Section 2(c) of the present Act makes any person, who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty, to be a public servant. The word ‘office’ is of indefinite connotation and, in the present context, it would mean a position or place to which certain duties are attached and has an existence which is independent of the persons who fill it.”

In order to appreciate the amplitude of the word ‘public servant’, the Court referred to the definition of ‘public duty’ under Section 2(b) of the PC Act

“Public duty means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest.”

In the present case, the Court found that since the respondent was the final authority with regard to the grant of admission, collection of fees and donation amount, a prima facie grave suspicion is made out regarding the the respondent being a public servant . The Court however cautioned that a detailed appreciation of evidence is called for before one can reach a conclusion as to the exact position of the respondent vis-a-vis the University.

  • Whether the accused respondent can be discharged under Section 227 of CrPC?

The Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation 2010 (9) SCC 368 wherein it was held that if the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

The Court, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the present case, came to the conclusion that the case is not an appropriate one to have exercised the power under section 227 to discharge the respondent. The Court observed that a prima facie case was made out as many incriminating documents were seized. The Court however cautioned that no opinion has been expressed on the merits of the case in the judgment.

Operative Portion of Judgement:

The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the State of Gujarat. The trial court was direct directed to proceed with the case expeditiously.